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Clark Borst†, Annemarie Landman∗ and Max Mulder†
† Aerospace Engineering – Delft University of Technology
Delft, The Netherlands
‡ Airline pilot, KLM, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
∗
TNO Human Factors, Soesterberg, The Netherlands
and Aerospace Engineering – Delft University of Technology
Delft, The Netherlands
In the analysis of human performance and human error, considerable attention is given to the
cognitive processes of actors involved in error or success scenarios. Even with awareness of
hindsight bias, it takes effort to understand the actions of agents in later inspection of error
scenarios. One such topic of heated discussion was the perceived poor performance of pilots in the
two 737 MAX MCAS-related crashes in applying the “memory item” checklist pertaining to a
runaway trim. In this paper, we argue that it is not so much the reproduction of the checklist that
was lacking in these scenarios, but the trigger for even starting the checklist. Not only trim
run-away problems, but several other issues likewise require an instant reaction from pilots,
designated as “memory items”. Rasmussen’s simplifed schematic for the “skill, rule and
knowledge” taxonomy already provides the tools for properly analyzing this. The skill to provide
the triggers for these reactions relies on pattern extraction from the available sensory input, and,
importantly, it can only be learned in a valid training context. It is argued that re-appraisal of these
items is needed, addressing explicitly the validity of the training environments that enable pilots to
learn the required pattern recognition skills.
Introduction
With improving technical reliability of aircraft, and improved training and team concepts for fight crew, aviation
safety has slowly but steadily improved (Pasztor & Martin, 2020). Each remaining accident or incident is carefully
analyzed to learn lessons for further safety improvements, and to watch for trends in aviation safety. The twin
accidents of the new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft certainly received their share of the aviation community’s attention.
In these accidents, a faulty sensor feeding its data into the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS), led to the MCAS system applying repeated nose-down pitch trim inputs, producing high forces on the
control column, so that the pilots were not able to keep the aircraft from entering a dive. Analyses led to conclusions
on failed oversight, a degradation in safety culture at Boeing, questioning of the practice of co-pilots with relatively
little fight experience, and the safety process of low-budget airlines.
Research on improving fight safety investigates issues such as the role of startle and surprise (Landman
et al., 2017), and training with variability (Landman et al., 2018). This work focuses on preparing pilots for failure
diagnosis and recovery, also in the presence of distracting startle conditions, and when operating with a possibly
wrong situational frame with respect to concepts on the aircraft and environment state. Other work focuses on safety
culture, (Dekker, 2006; Roelen & Klompstra, 2012), investigating an organization’s ability to instigate safe practices.
Research on specifc topics, such as the language and communication (Tajima, 2004), is work that can lead to
recommendations by certifying authorities.
It is important to understand that safety in fight operations depends in a large part on proper preparation.
Time to diagnose problems is often short, and the time pressure in fight impacts diagnostic capabilities. In some
conditions, with fight near aircraft limits such as stall or overspeed, or near terrain, the time available to the frst
action is counted in seconds. Most incidents are also not new and unique, like the erroneous MCAS activation was,
but can be reasonably prepared for. Hazard analysis and operational experience have resulted in a vast body of
possible failure cases, and pilots train for known cases such as engine failures, inadvertent stalls, wind shear
conditions, cabin leaks leading to depressurization, and a whole slew of technical malfunctions. Reference materials
and checklists are prepared for these cases, providing additional pre-programmed responses to foreseen trouble.
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In the aftermath of the 737 MAX crashes, several authors claimed that, even though the trim activation by
the MCAS system was inappropriate, the fight crew could have responded as taught, by performing the “memory
items” from the “Runaway Stabilizer” checklist. Of this checklist, the frst fve items are memory items, these are
actions that a pilot should study, learn by heart, and be able to perform without referring to the physical paper
checklist. They are also common with the items in checklists for previous 737 models, making them familiar to pilots
transitioning from previous models.
Boeing’s training materials for 737 MAX pilots do not even mention the MCAS system as a separate topic.
From later investigation, it appears that Boeing’s offcial consensus was that any malfunction of the MCAS system
would be handled by the pilots as if it were a “normal” trim system malfunction. It has now been recognized that
Boeing overly relied on the capability of pilots to provide the necessary responses to malfunctions (Anon., 2019).
Angle of attack sensor failure on the original 737 MAX
Both accident scenarios with the 737 MAX were triggered by the same failure of an angle of attack sensor on the
captain’s side. Signals from the angle of attack sensor affect a wide range of the aircraft’s systems:
• The pilot’s and co-pilot’s speed and altitude indications started to differ in both scenarios. This is due to the use
of the angle of attack value from the sensor for the correction of placement errors of the static and total
pressure sensors, correcting the output values of these sensors.1
• The measured angle of attack forms the basis for the activation of the captain’s stick shaker and low airspeed
warnings.
• The different values for angle of attack affect the feel systems for the captain’s and co-pilots control column
differently, leading to a “feel differential” message.
• The angle of attack sensor forms the input for the MCAS system, leading to repeated and aggressive pitch down
trim actions, but only for certain aircraft confguration, that is, with the autopilot disconnected and faps up.
This all produces a situation that does not resemble a normal “old school” runaway stabilizer trim incident.
We will subsequently look at the incidents, and use Rasmussen’s Skill, Rule and Knowledge taxonomy to understand
the pilots’ failure to start the trim checklist.
The Skill-Rule-Knowledge taxonomy inspected
Last week, I (the frst author) opened the family’s dishwasher with the intention to fll it with the dirty items that had
collected in the sink. As I noticed humid warm air coming off the machine, I changed my activity and cleaned out the
dishwasher, since it had fnished the cleaning cycle initiated by one of the other members of the household.
Rasmussen (Rasmussen, 1983; Rasmussen, 1986), presents a three-level taxonomy for human behavior,
allowing a rough categorization into skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-base behavior, see Fig. 1. This distinction
is useful, because each level of human behavior has its own strengths and weaknesses, and understanding which
behavior is needed in which work situation enables an analyst to assess training needs and possibilities for error. A
typical example of skill-based behavior would be manual fying of an aircraft, rule-based behavior would be
performing the checklist, and knowledge-based behavior would be assessing whether a fight can be performed
safely, given pilot skills, aircraft equipment and weather forecast. However, these examples do not do justice to the
richness of the concepts in the SRK taxonomy. Most rule-based behavior does not correspond to activities where
explicit rules have been formulated, and may equally be termed “habit-based”, or “routine-based”. Thus activities
like cleaning out the dishwasher, should be classifed as rule-based behavior. In this case, the activity of cleaning out
the dishwasher was triggered by a familiar perception of humid warm air.
1 Judging from the very large altitude and speed differences presented to the pilot and co-pilot, it might be assumed that this algorithm does not
cap the correction value, allowing unrealistic measured values to drastically infuence instrument presentation.
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Figure 1: Simplifed illustration of the skill-rule-knowledge taxonomy (Rasmussen, 1983)
Application to the MCAS incidents
To the reader or observer of transcripts, timelines, graphs and replays of aircraft accidents, it is often diffcult to
understand why the pilots did not initiate actions that would have led to a successful outcome. Of course, inspection
of the incident after the fact is prone to hindsight bias; the knowledge of the outcome places all facts in a biased
review, inviting the classifcation into wise and unwise decisions. It seems reasonable to assume that the pilots in both
scenarios knew how to perform the memory items from the Runaway Stabilizer checklist, which makes it all the more
curious why these actions were not performed swiftly or at all.
In Rasmussen’s simplifed model of SRK behavior, a signifcant clue is hidden in the connections between
the blocks. Rasmussen labels three kinds of information: signal, sign and symbol. Signals are for perceptual
communication. Signs are for triggering rule-based activities, and symbols are recognized morsels of information
about the outside world that are used in cognition and knowledge-based behavior. In Fig. 1 Rasmussen’s signs and
symbol lines both originate in the “feature formation” block, explicitly depicted at the skill level. In the checklist for
the 737 MAX (Fig. 2), the start of the procedure is simply listed as a condition: “Uncommanded stabilizer trim
movement occurs continuously”. This condition seems easy enough to detect; stabilizer trim movement is visible in
the trim wheels and audible on the fight deck. Since memory items on the checklist must be performed quickly and
skillfully, performing these items should be rule-based behavior. Rasmussen’s simple model indicates that this
rule-based behavior can be started by a “sign”, which must be a recognized condition that triggers this pre-learned
response. The recognition and production of the sign takes place at the skill level in Rasmussen’s taxonomy. If we
take the requirement that the Runaway Stabilizer checklist is executed swiftly and without delay, the pilots must
therefore both have the skill to almost instinctively recognize the trigger, and the practice and routine to execute the
required actions. The alternative option is to start these rule-based activities after knowledge-based evaluation, which
is undesirable, since this is a possibly lengthy and effort-full process.
For the checklist trigger to occur, two other conditions are needed; the trim must be uncommanded and
continuous. The Pilot Flying is supposed to recognize the condition, switch off autopilot and autothrottle, and, if
needed, command the Pilot Not Flying to move the Trim Cutout Switches to Cutout by stating: “Runaway Stabilizer,
memory items”. To complicate matters, uncommanded trim input in the 737 (MAX as well as older models), is quite
common. The Speed Trim System (STS), that is active in manual fight. can produce trim bursts of several second.
As the third author has experienced, these trim actions can be counter-intuitive when the pilot wants to accelerate or
decelerate.

324

9.1

Lion.air
73 7 Flight Cn ·w Operations :\'Ianual

-------i_ _ _
___
_ _ _ __
----J
Runaway
Stabilizer

t--

condition: Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement
occurs contin uously.
1 Control co lumn . . . . . . .

Hold fi rm ly

2 Autopilot (if engaged) . .

. Disengage

Do not re-engage the autopilot.
Control airplane pitch at titu de manua lly wit h
control co lumn and main electric trim as
needed.
3 Autothrottle (if engaged ) .

. Disengage

Do not re-engage the autothrottle.
4 If t he runaway stops alter the autopilot is
disengaged:
■■■■

5 If t he runaway continues alter t he aut opilot is
disengaged:
STAB TRI M CUTOUT
switches (bot h) . . . . . . . . . .... . . . CUTOUT

If the runaway continues:
Stabilizer
t rim wheel . . . . . .. . . . Grasp and hold
6 Stabilizer . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . Tri m manually
7 Anticipate trim requ irements.
• C ontinue d o n next pa ge •

J une 15, 2017

D6~27370~MAX<VILI

9.1

Figure 2: First page from the “Runaway Stabilizer” checklist (Thanhjono, 2019)
To further compound matters, the trim activation was not the only activity at the fight deck at that time. As
the Lion Air fight climbed out, pilots faced and became preoccupied with a “speed disagree” message, and differing
airspeed on the captain’s and co-pilot’s speed instruments. In addition, the altitude indications on the left and right
instruments disagreed. While confronted with the double problem, pilots were also questioning whether to turn back,
and negotiating with air traffc control on where to enter a holding, and on the – erroneous – altitude indication. The
co-pilot was focusing on stopping the climb and fnding a waypoint to fy to when the MCAS system started its frst
ten-second nose down trim action. In response, the captain trimmed the aircraft nose up again. In between, a
momentary “bank angle” warning was sounded by the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), then
“air speed low” warnings (while the air speed was actually high), and the stick shaker started to activate. On the
captain’s speed display, which was using data by the same faulty sensor that activated MCAS, the overspeed limits
and the low speed limits merged. With navigation tasks, feel differential pressure, fight control low pressure,
unreliable airspeed, stick shaker, the crew was busy on multiple tasks, and did not start the stabilizer runaway
checklist.
Strictly speaking, the condition listed in the checklist was not even met. Common in older generations of
aircraft, uncommanded stabilizer trim leading to a runaway was the result of either a trim switch on the control yoke
that does not disengage, or of a solenoid that stays stuck. The event is usually after a trim commanded by the pilot, in
the absence of other signals and events, and it is consistent; a trim that was initiated does not stop after the trim
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switch is released, but continues, steadily, in the original direction. This trigger is described in the checklist, and this
scenario is implied in the checklist description. As a young trainee, the frst author observed this phenomenon several
times in the video recordings of a fight experiment with a Swearingen Metro. The Metro’s pilots were accustomed to
the event, quickly pulled out the circuit breaker disconnecting the trim, cycled the trim switches and turned the circuit
breaker back on.
Because the Metro pilots were accustomed to the phenomenon, they instantly recognized the inappropriate
trim actions of the aircraft. To the new Boeing 737 MAX pilots, conventional trim problems were a thing of the past,
but the MCAS produced a-typical trim behavior in a non-typical context (i.e., not after one of the two pilots used the
trim) and during a very busy time. The nominal description in the checklist, “continuous” activation, does not match
what happened. The MCAS actions come in bursts, and untypically, in the opposite direction of the pilot’s trim
direction, instead of continuing in the same direction. The pilots in both accident scenarios only had received a
tablet-based training before transitioning to the new aircraft variant, and before the frst accident did not have any
information on the MCAS system. It is thus clear that they did not have experience with the pattern and context in
which the MCAS activates the trim system.
Considering Rasmussen’s SRK taxonomy and the simplifed model, it is clear that time-critical actions in
response to a trim runaway should be implemented as a combination of skill and rule-based behavior; knowledge
based behavior is too slow for this condition, and this justly motivates Boeing’s choice to designate the checklist items
as memory items. On the Lion Air fight preceding the accident fight with the same aircraft, the pilots did manage to
switch off the electric trim and thereby stop the MCAS actions. However, an additional pilot was present on that
fight in the observer’s seat. Possibly due to not being in the thick of controlling the aircraft, he had time to detect the
largest threat as coming from the uncommanded trim actions, and instructed the pilots to use the cutout switches.
Rasmussen’s diagram places the triggering signals for a procedure clearly in the skill domain. But simply by
not having experienced MCAS activation previously, there is no skill to recognize the start condition for the checklist.
The pattern recognition is not possible, and the sign for activating a rule-based sequence of actions is not produced.
With the short time available, and the multitude of sensory impressions, surviving an erroneous MCAS activation on
the original 737 MAX design is only likely if the condition for action is trained and recognizable as a familiar pattern.
This can only be achieved if detection and distinguishing of the trigger is practiced in the simulator using scenarios
that present the trigger in the correct context, possibly with a multitude of masking signals and detractors as present
in the accident scenario.
In this case, in the absence of the possibility to recognize a familiar pattern, the pilots are left with a large set
of observations, from the various instruments and warnings, and with parallel checklists and actions that these
indications require, and they lacked the time and capacity to determine which was the most urgent issue and attend to
it. In Rasmussen’s terms, in this scenario the pilots were forced to resort to knowledge-based behavior, which can be
slow, error-prone and is always laborious.
Wider implications
In the aftermath of the two accidents, the design of the MCAS system was re-evaluated, and its main problems are
addressed. The insight that oversight by certifying authorities and a degradation in safety culture at Boeing
contributed to unsafe designs and practices has prompted a wider review, and the correction of other identifed issues,
e.g., the lack of capacity of one of the fight control computers. However, based on Rasmussen’s proven insights,
wider implications can be seen. Each time a (foreseeable) failure condition requires immediate or near immediate
attention from pilots, we should ensure that not only the pilots have the opportunity to train and drill to execute their
response, but that they are also trained in recognizing the sign pattern in the multitude of signals available on the
fight deck, not just in isolated failure cases, but also in busy scenarios where multiple triggers for multiple checklists
compete.
This recognition requires more than pictures on a tablet or paper materials. Signal timing, strength, noise,
vibration, possibly heat, multiple cues need to be approximately correct. From people working on fight simulation
devices, we know that in the aftermath of the two accidents the hardware behind the motors providing the trim feel in
the 737 simulators had to be signifcantly upgraded, to approach the levels of forces present in the actual aircraft.
Also with the airline pilot’s job progression from an active, hands-on fight to supervisor and programmer of
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automation for fight, the need for simulator fdelity does not diminish. In all scenarios where quick action is required
to avert danger, the recognition of pilots must be trained until the patterns become familiar and recognizable even in
the presence of signifcant and distracting signals, and in unexpected situations. Constant innovation in training
scenarios is also needed to prevent pilots from recognizing a situation in a simulator session on the basis of
expectation (“second scenario, likely an engine failure during take-off”), because that would train for false patterns
that are not present in real fights.
Conclusion
With the introduction of the 737 MAX and its MCAS system, which was intended to keep the aircraft from stall
situations, Boeing assumed that the procedures for runaway trim would enable pilots to correct for potential
malfunctions in the MCAS system. Boeing’s assumption on the pilots’ ability to perform the necessary actions might
have been correct, but the assessment on whether pilots would readily recognize the condition for action was not. In
this paper, we propose a more accurate perspective on pilot behavior based on Rasmussen’s theory. This implies that
pattern and trigger recognition for situations that require near-immediate response must be trained in relevant training
environments, with the proper cues, and under a variety of conditions. This is not only needed for MCAS activation,
but for all checklists with memory items, and for all other situations that require a quick response while triggering
conditions may be ambiguous or vague. We should not force people at the sharp end to know when action is required
through cognitive reasoning, but instead we should ensure that they can train their pattern recognition skills.
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